Chapter 6

Creating a More Integrated and Effective National Security Apparatus

Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy

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Introduction

For well over a decade, the United States (U. S) has faced a security environment far more complex than that of the Cold War. Today's challenges – such as winning the global war on terror and slowing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – require multifaceted security strategies that take advantage of capabilities from across the full spectrum of national security agencies.

Yet, while today's challenges are vastly different from those of the Cold War, the structures and mechanisms the United States uses to develop and implement national security policy remain largely unchanged. Cabinet agencies continue to be the principal organizational element of national security policy, and each agency has its own strategies, capabilities, budget, culture, and institutional prerogatives to emphasize and protect.

The United States has entered an era in which cooperation and coordination among Cabinet agencies can make the difference between success and failure. The national security agencies can bring a wealth of experience, vision, and tools to bear on security challenges, but more often than not, the mechanisms to integrate the various dimensions of U.S. national security policy and to translate that policy into integrated programs and actions are extremely weak, if they exist at all.

Experts constantly point out that America's adversaries operate on a strategic timeline of years, if not decades, while senior U.S. officials find it almost impossible to break the tyranny of the inbox and find time for

[1] Reprinted by Permission, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: U.S. Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era Phase 2 Report, CSIS, Washington DC, July 2005, Chapter 2.

strategic planning. Because the budget process remains largely focused at the Cabinet agency level, even policies that do result from strategic planning in one agency can founder because their objectives may not be reflected in critical resource decisions in another. Similarly, attempts to coordinate related activities across departments to maximize their effects can falter because agencies do not define geographic regions and functional issues the same way, and lack the time, resources, or inclination to work closely with interagency counterparts.

Even at the highest level, the executive branch does not take a holistic approach to the most pressing security problems. For example, two different Cabinet level councils—the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council—have responsibility for problems that are fundamentally inseparable.

Greater unity of effort in U.S. national security policy will not happen on its own. Senior officials in the White House, the Defense Department, the State Department, and other agencies need a stronger architecture for policy development, implementation, and oversight. This architecture should take a "cradle to grave" approach, enabling development of strategic policy objectives that are translated into executable policy initiatives resourced according to their strategic priority – and whose implementation is overseen with sufficient rigor to ensure they have a chance to succeed.

Building this architecture will require reshaping national security organizations to emphasize integration across agency boundaries and budgets and make a long-term investment in the career professionals who make up these agencies.

Institutionalizing Strategic Planning for National Security

Every President, every National Security Adviser, and every Cabinet secretary faces a vexing challenge from the moment they take office until the moment they step down: how to keep the urgent from crowding out the important. In the national security arena, "the tyranny of the inbox" often becomes "the tyranny of managing today's crises." For reasons both practical

and political, the day's headlines, meetings with counterparts, actions about to occur on Capitol Hill, and crises at home and abroad often set the day to day agenda for senior leaders in government. This understandable focus on today, however, often precludes strategic thinking about tomorrow.

In a highly complex and uncertain international security environment, this near–term focus brings some substantial risks. Perhaps most importantly, it can force the United States into a predominantly reactive posture in which its options are, by definition, more limited. When the United States fails to anticipate crises or problems before they occur, it forfeits potential opportunities to prevent them or to minimize their consequences, and consequently incurs higher costs associated with responding to them after the fact. When U.S. leaders fail to look over the horizon, they also can miss opportunities to shape the international environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests and to hedge against developments detrimental to those interests. Finally, without a long-term perspective, policymakers lack the bigger picture they need to set the nation's priorities wisely and make tough choices about where to place emphasis and where to accept or manage a degree of risk.

The U.S. government currently lacks both the incentives and the capacity necessary to support strategic thinking and long-range planning in the national security arena. As mentioned, it is extremely difficult to divert the attention of national security officials beyond the crises and demands of the day. In addition, while individuals on the National Security Council (NSC) staff may develop planning documents for their respective issues, the NSC staff lacks adequate capacity to conduct integrated long-range planning for the President.

While some capacity for strategic planning exists in the Department of Defense, no other department devotes substantial resources to planning for the long-term future. Although the State Department's policy planning office develops a "big picture" approach in specific policy areas, like NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) enlargement or U.S. relations with China, it tends (with some exceptions) to focus on issues already on the policy agenda rather than challenges that might loom over the horizon. Nor

does it address the types of capabilities the United States should seek to develop to deal with future challenges.[2]

Recognizing this gap, Congress sought to force strategic planning on the executive branch by requiring in law that the President submit a National Security Strategy along with the annual budget request.[3] Unfortunately, this requirement has not always produced the intended strategic thinking on national security. Rather, each administration from President Reagan on has chosen to treat this statute primarily as a requirement to publicly explain and sell its policies rather than an opportunity to undertake a rigorous internal strategic planning process. The result has consistently been a glossy document that serves a public affairs function, but does little to guide U.S. national security policymaking and resource allocation. Consequently, there is no national security analogue to DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review – no established process for delineating the nation's security strategy and the capabilities required to implement it.

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[2] Similarly, a number of agencies now develop "strategic plans" to comply with the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, but these plans tend not to have significant impact on the policy-making and program implementation of their respective Departments.

[3] Congress amended the 1947 National Security Act in 1986 as part of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act to require the President to transmit to Congress each year, with the submission of the budget, a comprehensive report on the national security strategy of the United States. See Sec. 108 [50 U.S.C. 404a]. When a new President takes office, he or she must submit a national security strategy report within 150 days of taking office. Each national security strategy report shall set forth the national security strategy of the United States and shall include a comprehensive description and discussion of the following: (1) The worldwide interests, goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to the national security of the United States; (2) The foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities of the United States necessary to deter aggression and to implement the national security strategy of the United States; (3) The proposed short-term and long-term uses of the political, economic, military, and other elements of the national power of the United States to protect or promote the interests and achieve the goals and objectives referred to in paragraph (1); (4) The adequacy of the capabilities of the United States to carry out the national security strategy of the United States, including an evaluation of the balance among the capabilities of all elements of the national power of the United States to support the implementation of the national security strategy; (5) Such other information as may be necessary to help inform Congress on matters relating to the national security strategy of the United States.

The absence of an institutionalized process for long-range national security planning puts the United States at strategic disadvantage. If the United States wants to defeat global terrorism, keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) out of the wrong hands, and deal with other threats to its vital interests, it needs to have a proactive national security policy that is sustainable over the long term. Achieving this requires building more capacity for long-range planning at the highest levels of the U.S. government and creating incentives for harried decisionmakers to participate in the process.

Recommendations

A robust strategic planning process for national security should include the following elements:

- ***Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) to develop U.S. national security strategy and determine the capabilities required to implement the strategy.***

Every four years, at the outset of his or her term, the President should designate a senior national security official (most likely the National Security Adviser) to lead an interagency process to develop a U.S. national security strategy and identify the capabilities required—economic, diplomatic, military, informational, and so on—to implement the strategy. The review would engage all of the national security agencies in an effort to produce both the National Security Planning Guidance described below and the unclassified National Security Strategy already mandated by Congress.[4] The review would begin with an assessment of the future security environment and the development of national security objectives. The heart of the exercise would be devising a national security strategy for achieving these objectives, identifying the capabilities required to implement the strategy, and delineating agency roles and responsibilities. Such a process would provide every administration with an opportunity to conduct a strategic

[4] The study team believes the Congressional requirement for the President to submit a National Security Strategy each year should be amended to require a Quadrennial National Security Review instead.

review of U.S. national security policies and capability requirements and to define a way forward for the future. The QNSR should logically precede and provide the conceptual basis for agency reviews like DoD's Quadrennial Defense Review.[5]

- ***Create a classified National Security Planning Guidance to be reviewed by the NSC, signed by the President in the first year of a new administration, and updated on a biannual basis.***

The President's National Security Planning Guidance would articulate his or her national security objectives and the strategy and capabilities required to achieve them. It would provide planning guidance, directing the National Security Adviser and Cabinet Secretaries to develop particular courses of action and undertake specific activities in support of the strategy, as well as capabilities guidance – developed in conjunction with OMB (Office of Management and Budget) – identifying baseline capability requirements in priority areas. This document would provide the conceptual basis for the unclassified National Security Strategy, the development of interagency concepts of operation, and the conduct of interagency mission area reviews as described below. It would also be the starting point for all of the national security departments to develop their own implementing strategies, such as DoD's defense strategy. To be effective, the development of this National Security Planning Guidance would have to be a top-down, rather than bottom-up, effort that would engage the President and the national security principals.[6]

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[5] This would likely require delaying the start of the QDR and other agency reviews until the basic conclusions of the QNSR are known. Consequently, agency reviews would not likely be completed until the second year of a President's term.

[6] Perhaps the best historical analogue for this process was President Eisenhower's Solarium Project as described in Nottberg, Tyler, "Once and Future Policy Planning: Solarium for Today," in Living History. The Eisenhower Institute. Available at http://www.eisenhowerinstitute.org/programs/livinghistory/solarium.htm; and in Bowie, Robert. "President Eisenhower Establishes His National Security Process," in Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: Seventy-Six Case Studies in Presidential Leadership, David Abshire, ed. Westport: Praeger, 2001, 152-154.

- ***Establish semi-annual "Over the Horizon" reviews for agency deputies to anticipate potential future crises and challenges, and to stimulate proactive policy development.***

In these meetings, the Director of National Intelligence would present the Deputies – representing NSC, OMB and all of the agencies involved in national security – with an "over the horizon look" at possible developments in the international security environment one year, five years, and ten years or more in the future. This material would be developed in concert with the broader intelligence community and would aim to highlight not only points of consensus but also areas of uncertainty and debate that should inform national decision-making. This review would increase the visibility of longer-term trends, plausible developments, and "wild cards" in order to stimulate more proactive consideration of ways the United States could shape the international environment.[7] This review process could also stimulate interagency planning efforts and provide scenarios for the exercise program described below.

- ***Establish an annual table-top exercise program for senior national security officials to practice managing future national security challenges and identify capability shortfalls that need to be addressed.***

This exercise program would serve several functions. First, it would allow senior national security officials an opportunity to experience managing a crisis or complex operation, without the costs and risks involved in a real-world situation. Second, each exercise would enable these officials to identify courses of action that might prevent or deter a crisis and responses the United States should explore and develop further.[8] Finally, these simulations would enable the participants to identify critical gaps in U.S. capabilities and task

[7] Such reviews would build on but be broader in scope than the existing interagency reviews of the NIC watch list, which aims to identify countries on the brink of instability or failure.

[8] Identified courses of action could be more fully developed and explored in the wake of the exercise, possibly for presentation at the next such session.

development of action plans to address them. Progress in implementing these action plans could be reviewed in subsequent exercises or as part of the biannual National Security Planning Guidance process.

- ***Create an NSC Senior Director and office dedicated to strategic planning.***

In support of the above recommendations, the NSC requires a small but empowered staff devoted to strategic planning. The proposed Senior Director for Strategic Planning would be responsible for drafting and staffing the President's National Security Planning Guidance, working with the Director of National Intelligence to prepare the semi-annual "over the horizon" reviews, and overseeing the annual national security exercise program.[9]

Strengthening the Links Between Policy, Resource Allocation and Execution

In administration after administration, senior national security officials have lamented that policy decisions taken in Washington are not always reflected in the programs and activities of agencies in the field. Whether the challenge is implementing a complex program, like biodefense, across multiple departments of government or integrating the efforts of various U.S. agencies in a given region of the world, the gap between setting policy priorities and effectively executing them is one of the hardiest and most frustrating perennials in our system of government.

This section examines three different aspects of this problem: the lack of an agreed interagency approach or "concept of operation" for a number of high priority mission areas; the inadequacy of current processes to ensure that agency budgets reflect the President's highest national security priorities; and the absence of adequate mechanisms to coordinate the policy implementation of diverse U.S. actors within various regions of the world. In

[9] The recent reorganization of the NSC staff includes a new "Senior Adviser for Strategic Planning," but the responsibilities of this position do not appear to be as expansive as what is proposed here.

each case, the Beyonbd Goldwater-Nichols Study Team team recommends specific measures to strengthen the link between stated policy priorities and their execution.

Interagency "Concepts of Operation"

The U.S. government's level of experience with and capabilities to execute important missions such as stability operations, homeland security, counterterrorism, and combating WMD vary widely. The study team's analysis focused on these four mission areas, but these are only representative cases, and our recommendations could be applied to other mission areas as well.[10]

While the United States has conducted a wide range of stability operations in the last ten to fifteen years, it still tends to conduct each operation on a rather *ad hoc* basis. Past operations have suffered from poor interagency planning, slow response time, insufficient resources, and little unity of effort among agencies, as well as infighting and competition among organizations in the field. Because sufficient capacity to respond to complex contingencies does not exist elsewhere in government, the Department of Defense often finds itself with the lead role in stability operations – despite the fact that it has no comparative advantage in many of the tasks these operations require.

Fighting terrorism, while certainly an important mission over the last two decades, has become a mission of vital interest since the September 11 attacks, and the scale of counterterrorist operations has expanded dramatically as a result. In the past, U.S. policy toward terrorism tended to be relatively reactive; the United States sought generally to deter terrorism, and if it was attacked, tried to punish state sponsors and bring the terrorists themselves to

[10] The BG-N (Beyond Goldwater-Nichols) study team focused on these four mission areas because each of them will likely play a prominent role in how the United States manages the challenges posed by the future security environment, yet to date they have generally been treated as lesser included cases of more traditional missions like warf-ighting. The study team did not view these four cases as the definitive set of important missions relevant to the future, but did feel they would present a potentially rich set of missions through which to explore the issue of unity of effort.

justice through the legal system, if possible. Since September 11, not only is the United States working much more aggressively to defeat terrorists and deny them sanctuary, it is also more focused on the need to address the societal conditions that provide fertile ground for terrorism. This broader approach to counterterrorism requires the application and integration of a much wider range of instruments of national power than has been used in the past.

As a mission, homeland security has come to the forefront since September 11, 2001. The mission of combating weapons of mass destruction has roots in previous nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts, but has grown to encompass new areas, such as proactively interdicting potential WMD shipments and identifying, securing and eliminating WMD. Of the four mission areas the study team examined, these two have the least developed intellectual framework to guide the policy development process.

Among the four mission areas, there is little agreement on how to define the challenges and major issues. Various Cabinet agencies define the missions differently and use different terms to discuss the critical issues. As a result, agency representatives, subject matter experts, and stakeholders outside the federal government, such as state and local governments or non-governmental organizations, frequently talk past each other.

The lack of common terminology for these four mission areas indicates the absence of comprehensive, integrated interagency approaches to them. For example, the complexity of securing the homeland and combating WMD in a resource-constrained environment virtually demands that policies be developed based on risk assessments, to ensure efficient use of limited resources. But to date there are no common risk assessments guiding policies in these areas.

Finally and tellingly, in most instances there are still considerable debates about which Cabinet agencies have lead responsibilities in what areas, what constitutes effective coordination, and what programs should reside in which Department budgets. For example, National Security Presidential Directive 17, signed on September 17, 2002, lays out a broad strategy for

combating weapons of mass destruction, but it does not include a significant discussion of roles and responsibilities within the federal government. The National Response Plan[11] outlines roles and responsibilities in the event of disaster or attack within the United States, but applies only to the response portion of the homeland security mission. The National Strategy for Homeland Security delineates roles and responsibilities to a degree, but is not sufficiently specific to resolve many important debates in this area. And in some areas, such as intelligence and information analysis, the roles and responsibilities outlined in this national security document have been overtaken by changes to the organizational landscape that have emerged from the intelligence reform effort.

Recommendations

- ***Develop common terminologies for each interagency mission area, using NSC-led interagency working groups.***

These working groups should focus initially on developing common definitions of the mission in each of the four areas, and then identify and define key terms in each mission area. Over time, this effort should include all priority mission areas identified in the President's National Security Planning Guidance. Common terminology would enable interagency and other relevant stakeholders to discuss these mission areas in the same language, which would greatly facilitate efforts to build the intellectual framework for them. The goal of such an effort would not be a comprehensive dictionary of terms, but basic agreement on the key terms used to define a mission area and its critical tasks.

- ***Develop common interagency concepts of operation for each mission area, using NSC-led interagency working groups.***

Once a common terminology for each of the key mission areas exists, the working groups should focus on developing a basic interagency concept of

[11] U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, (Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security, December 2004).

operation for each mission area. In the context of these four mission areas, the NSC-led interagency working groups would develop an overall description or picture of how the U.S. federal government envisions accomplishing each mission. These concepts of operation would outline major assumptions about the challenges inherent in the mission areas, including risk assessments that would help prioritize efforts. They would also describe *how* the federal government will apply the full range of capabilities at its disposal to achieve its desired objectives or effects.

Put another way, if securing the homeland or combating WMD is the policy "end" and the range of capabilities resident in DHS, DoD, and other agencies are the "means," the concept of operation for these missions articulates the "ways" capabilities will be applied to achieve the policy objectives.

In some instances, individual Cabinet agencies and sub-components have already developed CONOPS (Concept of Operations) outlining specific approaches to particular missions. While agencies should be encouraged to develop subordinate concepts describing how their specific capabilities could contribute to the overall concept of operations, this should not be seen as a substitute for developing the interagency concepts of operation that are so critical to achieving true unity of effort across the U.S. government.

When finished, the interagency CONOPS can become the basis for developing requirements in each mission area. Formal requirements will make it easier to determine whether existing U.S. capabilities are adequate, and where gaps in existing capabilities may exist. Each agency can use those requirements and assessments of necessary capabilities as essential inputs to its programming and budgeting process.

- ***Develop an agreed set of interagency roles and responsibilities for key mission areas using an NSC-led interagency working group; codify the roles and responsibilities in a series of National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD); and embody in legislation those roles and responsibilities in each mission area that are enduring.***

After developing concepts of operation for each key mission area, the interagency working groups could use them to help develop clear, agreed sets of roles and responsibilities for all relevant stakeholders.

In some areas, roles and responsibilities have already been defined. For example, NSPD-33 outlines the division of labor for biodefense in the 21st century. But NSPD-33 was written in the absence of agreed, overarching concepts of operation for combating WMD or for homeland security, and focuses on only a portion of the broader mission area. As a result, it may need to be updated.

Similarly, several Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) outline aspects of the homeland security challenge, and discuss roles and responsibilities related to those specific elements, but no HSPD consolidates a discussion of roles and responsibilities into one document or is based on a comprehensive, agreed interagency approach to the mission.

Because these missions are evolving, it may be desirable to initially define roles and responsibilities through a series of presidential directives that would provide the President with the flexibility to adjust and adapt them to reflect significant changes in the strategic environment.

But limiting codification of roles and responsibilities to presidential directives would mean that with each new administration, progress in the area of interagency roles and responsibilities could be eroded or lost entirely. Turnover at senior levels can result in loss of institutional memory, and old bureaucratic battles being re-fought. New policy objectives might demand that old agreements be revisited. For the aspects of these missions that seem least prone to significant change in the next five to ten years, passing legislation to codify agreed roles and responsibilities is the best way to preserve hard-won advances in creating greater unity of effort across the interagency. Such legislation could also provide the basis for realigning agency authorities and resources to ensure that each agency has the capabilities it needs to execute its assigned tasks.

Ensuring Budgets Reflect National Security Priorities

In addition to the challenge of creating integrated interagency approaches to critical mission areas, every administration grapples with the problem of translating its strategic priorities into actual programs and budgets. Funding is a critical tool for ensuring that policy decisions are carried out in programming decisions.

But today's budgeting processes are largely unchanged from the Cold War era. Agencies for the most part prepare their own budgets in "stovepipes." These budgets are keyed to OMB-issued top-line fiscal guidance and to individual agency priorities, but not always to common strategic priorities as they may be articulated at the national level across agencies. Furthermore, no consistent process exists for developing budgets across agencies against these policy priorities.[12] Without a set of articulated priorities against which agency budgets can be examined on an interagency basis, the government has little means of assuring that the hard choices on funding national security missions are being considered within the context of a particular mission and/or against the full range of the President's top goals and objectives.

Today, nearly all national security priorities have a multi-agency dimension in both policy development and execution. That is certainly the case for the 21st century mission areas discussed above—stability operations, counterterrorism, homeland security, and combating WMD. Homeland security has particularly complicated policymaking by adding a number of new players to the traditional State/Defense/CIA national security policy process. As noted in the section above, these mission areas lack comprehensive, integrated interagency approaches. Without common concepts of operation, it is not possible to comprehensively review the programs required to execute them.

Beyond that, *within* these mission areas, core programs are commonly interagency in nature. To cite one example in the homeland security area,

[12] See also discussion in Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, 366-367.

the national biodefense program requires cross-cutting functions such as information management and communications, research development and acquisition, and maintenance of biodefense infrastructure. Multiple cabinet agencies have responsibilities for implementing this program, including, among others, the Secretary of Homeland Security (domestic incident management), the Secretary of State (international terrorist incidents outside U.S. territory), and the Department of Defense (support for foreign consequence management operations).[13]

Yet, for the most part, the procedures for examining budget priorities have not kept pace with the way the government designs and implements policy priorities. Current processes for tying policies to budget priorities and looking at cross-agency trade-offs are far from systematic. At its core, the problem has been insufficient coordination between defense and non-defense budgets, and across non-defense budgets, during their development within the executive branch.

At the White House level, neither the National Security Council nor National Economic Council staffs have an institutionalized role in coordinating resources across national security agencies. Some individuals at senior levels within the NSC have taken a particular interest in budget matters and supported the OMB budget process, but that interest has tended to ebb and flow with personalities. More frequently, NSC offices with specific regional or functional responsibilities have worked closely with OMB to track or support specific initiatives. While this is useful, the process lacks a senior NSC policy official designated to look across national security priorities and work with OMB on budget trade-off decisions across those priorities and across agencies.

OMB – the main driver of the budget process – is viewed as a dependable, often un-biased, White House player with expertise about how programs work and how to pay for them. On the other hand, it is principally concerned with the fiscal dimension of the overall budget. This primary task of fiscal control means OMB does not have the tools to develop, evaluate, and endorse

[13] Biodefense for the 21st Century;http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/20040430.html.

robust and resource-intensive policy options. While it is excellent at finding resources to support Presidential priorities, the OMB process alone does not necessarily result in a realignment of resources to reflect policy priorities – either within any budget function or across functions.

The budget cycle begins when OMB provides top-line fiscal guidance to agencies. Agencies then prepare budgets over the spring and summer (with varying degrees of OMB involvement), and submit them to OMB for review in the fall, prior to submission of the formal President's Budget to Congress in early February of the following year. OMB considers the agencies' budget requests and sets funding levels, meeting separately with agencies on specific program requests in "hearings" before final budget numbers are set.[14] The NSC staff is invited to participate in the OMB-led "hearings" on the national security portion of the budget in autumn, but with the exception of the DoD budget, the NSC is rarely involved prior to that time.

Examining the budget from a cross-cutting perspective should affect not only this deliberate annual budget planning, but also requirements that may emerge throughout the year, such as post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. The security environment is not static, and to be responsive to the changing environment, the process must be designed accordingly.

Recommendation

- ***Conduct NSC/OMB mission area reviews for top national security priorities that require interagency implementation.***

Mission area reviews should help to more systematically identify gaps, duplication, or misalignment among agencies. Recognizing the challenges inherent in the budget process, the study team believes this strengthened

[14] This section describing the current process draws heavily from an unpublished working paper developed for the BG-N project by Anne Richard, entitled "Interagency Resource Allocations: Understanding and Reforming How Resources Are Allocated," November 2003.

review process – with NSC providing the policy focus and OMB the fiscal focus – should be confined to very specific mission areas that are among the most critical Presidential priorities and require implementation across multiple US Government agencies.

Specifically, these mission area reviews would include the following elements:

- First, the NSC Senior Director for Strategic Planning, in coordination with other NSC senior directors and key agencies, would develop capabilities guidance as part of the President's National Security Planning Guidance described above. This guidance would articulate the baseline capabilities and programs in key mission areas and would be issued in the spring, prior to development of the agencies' respective budgets.

- Second, once the President's National Security Planning Guidance is issued, OMB should be the lead in tracking planned resource allocation against Presidentially-mandated priorities, before agencies submit their budgets to OMB.

- Third, OMB and the NSC should co-chair interagency mission area reviews before agency budgets are finalized. These would build on the "hearing" process in place today, but would be broader in scope and participation and would be held on a regular basis. They might be conducted in two phases: in the early summer, before agency submissions to OMB; and in the fall, as part of the process of finalizing the President's budget submission to Congress. Extra reviews would be held as needed for crisis issues not foreseen in the budget.

- Finally, significant unresolved issues would be raised to the President for decision, as is the case today.

For specific high priority mission areas, budgets would be presented to Congress not only in the traditional form, but also as a cross-cut. Such a

presentation would enhance the executive branch ability to defend its submissions in these areas based on the rationale with which they were developed.[15]

The proposed process argues for not only strengthening OMB's partnership with the NSC but also raising the level of "budgetary literacy" among senior national security policy officials through targeted training and hands-on experience.[16]

Integrating Day to Day Policy Execution in Regions

In any given region of the world, from East Asia to Latin America, U.S. national security policy is implemented daily by a multiplicity of actors: U.S. ambassadors, in-country representatives from agencies ranging from USAID to the FBI, regional and functional Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) and their subordinate military commanders, and so on.

Although regional COCOMs are charged with integrating the activities of the U.S. military in their areas of responsibility, there is no standing mechanism for integrating the activities of all U.S. government players in a given region. Moreover, each of the key national security departments defines the regions differently, creating sometimes troublesome seams and overlaps in the policy implementation process.[17] As a result, U.S. government

[15] There is some precedent for this approach. In the 1990s, OMB developed budget "cross cuts" for several priority mission areas, such as combating terrorism, counter-narcotics, and counter-proliferation. More recently, it has developed cross-cuts for homeland security and combating terrorism. For another proposal to strengthen NSC and OMB planning and coordination to build capabilities to meet new threats, see John Deutch, Arnold Kantor, and Brent Scowcroft with Chris Hornbarger, "Strengthening the National Security Interagency Process," in Ashton B. Carter and John P. White, eds., Keeping the Edge: Managing Defense for the Future (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 265-284.

[16] This recommendation was suggested by Gordon Adams, former Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs at OMB.

[17] For example, the State Department divides the world into six regions: Africa, Europe and Eurasia, Near East, Western Hemisphere, East Asia and Pacific, and South Asia. The Office of the Secretary of Defense divides the world into four regions: Africa, Asia and Pacific, Near East and South Asia, and Western Hemisphere. Within the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, the world is divided into the following regions: Asia Pacific, Latin America, Africa, Near East and South Asia, and Russia and Europe. The Unified Command Plan divides the world into

programs and actions in a region are often uncoordinated (as in the right hand not knowing what the left is doing) or entirely incoherent (as in one agency's actions contradicting or conflicting with another's). Strengthening the link between policy made in Washington and its execution in the field requires greater integration of U.S. government programs and activities on a regional basis.

Recommendations

- ***Establish a common USG-wide framework for defining the regions of the world.***

The NSC should lead an interagency review of how various agencies divide the world into regions for the purposes of policy execution, with the aim of creating a common regional framework that could be used across the U.S. government. The resulting framework should be reviewed and updated on a regular basis to ensure it adapts to changes in the international security environment.

- ***Conduct regular NSC-chaired interagency "summits" in each region.***

The NSC Senior Director for a given region should convene on a regular basis, on behalf of the National Security Adviser and the President, a "summit" of the senior USG officials with policy execution responsibilities in the region, including (but not limited to) the relevant ambassadors and COCOM. These summits would review current and planned activities in the region in light of the President's priorities, policies, and planning guidance. They should also identify ways to improve unity of effort and develop strategies by which the United States could shape the environment and possibly prevent crises. These summits might also provide useful bottom-up input into interagency processes for crisis action planning, as described in the next chapter.

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5 AoRs that differ from OSD(P) ISA's breakdown. NORTHCOM has the US, Canada and Mexico, SOUTHCOM has Central and South America, CENTCOM has the Middle East and the Newly Independent States of former USSR, EUCOM has Greenland, Europe, Russia and Africa, and PACOM has India, China, the rest of the Pacific, Australia and Antarctica.

In the longer term, the U.S. government should consider establishing standing Regional Security Councils, composed of senior representatives from all of the national security departments, that would coordinate U.S. policy execution on a day-to-day basis and seek approaches to shape the regional environment in favorable ways.

- ***Enhance opportunities and networks for information sharing and collaboration across agency lines and with coalition partners.***

Information flow among agencies of the U.S. government operating around the world remains remarkably constricted. The barriers to information sharing and collaboration on an interagency basis stem from a combination of policy constraints, cultural barriers, and technological inadequacies. Similar obstacles hamper information sharing with U.S. partners and allies. Achieving greater unity of effort in day to day policy execution requires improving how the U.S. government manages and shares information internally and with its partners.

Building on initiatives such as the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the regional Commands and proposals to make DoD's regional centers more interagency in character is a useful starting point. Beyond that, the NSC should establish an interagency working group to conduct a review of current national and agency policies on information sharing with the aim of removing counterproductive constraints. It should also seek to accelerate the efforts of the Department of Defense and the intelligence community to build networked information technology architectures that would enhance information sharing and collaboration among the national security agencies of the U.S. government. Solutions identified for the U.S. government might also provide a basis for improving information sharing with key allies and partners.

Developing the Human Resources to Support a More Integrated National Security Approach

Perhaps the most essential requirement to implement the above recommendations is a true national security career path across government

– one that produces an educated and trained workforce with the skills and experience to integrate all the instruments of national power into effective national security policies, plans, and operations. Although there are many talented career professionals within government, such a workforce does not exist today.

Despite multiple and repeated calls for significant reform by a wide range of blue ribbon panels and commissions, little progress has been made across the U.S. government toward revitalizing the federal workforce.[18] Put simply, the national security agencies of the federal government lack the tools and resources to recruit and retain sufficient top-notch talent.[19]

Not only is the federal government poorly positioned to recruit and retain enough of the best and the brightest, the Cabinet agencies with significant responsibilities for national security[20] do not have career paths for their

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[18] A sample of the recent literature on civilian resource management includes the following: (i) U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report (February 2001); (ii) Defense Science Board Task Force, Human Resources Strategy (February 2000); (iii) The National Commission on the Public Service, Urgent Business for America: Revitalizing the Federal Government for the 21st Century (January 2003) (iv) GAO Report, Senior Executive Service: Enhanced Agency Efforts Needed to Improve Diversity as the Senior Corps Turns Over (October 2003); (v) GAO Report, DoD Personnel: DoD Actions Needed to Strengthen Civilian Human Capital Strategic Planning and Integration with Military Personnel and Sourcing Decisions (March 2003); and (vi) GAO Report, Human Capital: DoD's Civilian Personnel Strategic Management and the Proposed National Security Personnel System (May 2003).

[19] As noted in the Phase 1 Report of the Beyond Goldwater-Nichols project, "the problem stems from multiple sources: competition from private sector opportunities with often superior pay and fewer bureaucratic frustrations; complex and rigid hiring and security clearance procedures that can take months to complete; perceptions of government as a plodding bureaucracy where young talent lies increasingly fallow; and a changing labor market that increasingly views the notion of a single-employer career as undesirable and anachronistic." (Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase 1 Report, page 52.)

[20] While many federal agencies today have roles in national security, for the purposes of this section of the report, the BG-N study team focused on the Departments of Defense, State, Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Justice Department and parts of the Departments of Treasury, Commerce and Energy.

civilian professionals that encourage them to develop the types of skills the government needs most. They are not encouraged to serve outside of their home agencies, nor are they provided significant interagency training or education. In fact, rotations outside of one's home agency can be very difficult to arrange, and often even damage prospects for promotion. While the strategic environment increasingly demands integrated approaches and interagency operations, very few professional development structures are in place to develop "jointness" at the interagency level.

Recommendation

- ***Working with Congress and the national security agencies, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) should develop a national security career path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out interagency experience, education, and training. Congress should approve a 10% personnel float for key civilian agencies to enable interagency education, training, and rotations.***

One of the most important changes made in the original Goldwater-Nichols legislation was the creation of the Joint Service Officer designation and associated incentives for officers to seek joint service as a way of advancing their careers. Once joint service became essentially a requirement for promotion to General or Flag Officer, the best talent in each of the Services began to seek out joint assignments.

Building on this model, OPM should work with Congress and the Cabinet agencies involved in national security to develop a national security career path for civilian professionals.[21] Like the Joint Service Officer model, this

[21] This system is very similar in approach to the National Security Service Corps proposed in the Phase III report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (i.e. the Hart-Rudman Commission). See Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century (February 15, 2001), 118. The Phase 1 Report of the Beyond-Goldwater Nichols project recommended creation of a Defense Professional Corps that would apply to DoD career civilians; in Phase 2, the BG-N study team realized that in order to build the needed capacity for interagency operations in the federal government, expansion of the Defense Professional Corps concept to the broader set of national security agencies would be essential.

system would create incentives for civilian national security professionals to rotate to assignments outside their home organizations, thereby broadening the experience of individual careerists and creating a pool of civilian professionals with experience in interagency policy development, programs, and operations.[22]

To develop and oversee implementation of a national security career path, the Office of Personnel Management should chair an interagency oversight board composed of representatives from each of the participating agencies. This board would identify the positions in the federal government that would be designated as "interagency duty assignments" (IDA) and determine the prerequisites for each. The board would also monitor the development of participating careerists to encourage home agencies to ensure that when individuals return from rotational assignments, they are placed in positions in their home agencies that leverage their joint experience.[23]

Creating a pool of interagency duty assignments across government is a central component of developing a national security career path, but equally important is linking these rotational assignments to increased upward mobility for those who participate. Making promotion to the Senior Foreign Service or Senior Executive Service (SES) for national security related positions contingent on completing a rotational assignment would radically alter the prevailing view in government that outside assignments virtually guarantee stepping off the promotion track.

Linking rotational assignments to accelerated promotion consideration for career civil servants at lower GS-levels (for example, those in Grades 13 and 14) would push the incentives further down into the career ranks and speed up the culture change needed to move from stove-piping to interagency

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[22] Members of the Foreign Service, while often perceived as different from individuals serving in GS positions, are also civil servants. The BG-N study team views the Foreign Service as an important component of the larger pool of career civil servants that would participate in this national security career path.

[23] If OPM and the agencies do not act in a timely fashion, Congress should step in to create the necessary legislation.

integration. Home agencies, not the OPM-chaired interagency oversight board, would retain control over the promotion process for their employees in this proposed system. All agencies participating in the system, however, would need to comply with the OPM mandated requirements that, to be eligible for SES, candidates must have completed an IDA rotation, and that GS-13s and GS-14s who complete an IDA will be immediately eligible for step increases and considered for promotion under accelerated timelines.

Interagency education and training also will be central to the creation of a national security career path that develops real interagency professionals. Just as national security career professionals who want to join the Senior Executive Service or Senior Foreign Service will be required to complete an IDA assignment, they also should be required to complete some amount of interagency education or training before being promoted. In addition to existing billets for civilians at the National War College and the Foreign Service Institute Senior Seminar, Congress should create a new Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations that would focus on training national security professionals in planning, managing, and overseeing complex contingencies and on preparing for deployments to specific operations. Should the Department of Homeland Security establish an educational center for its senior professionals, participation in that program might also fulfill the education and training requirements associated with the national security career path.

Critical to making a national security career path work is creating a "personnel float" for participating agencies that will enable rotations, education, and training as careerists move through the ranks. Congress allows the Military Services 10-15 percent additional end strength to create a float sufficient to ensure the joint service officer process can work. A similar approach is needed for national security agencies, beginning at the GS-13 level and above, to enable them to meet the professional development requirements of the national security career path.

Such a float would not be cost-free, but the return on investment in terms of the enhanced performance of government operations would be considerable.

Creating a pool of career professionals with significant experience in interagency policy development and operations could help to break down the cultural barriers between agencies that too often hamper effective U.S. government action. Over time, enhancing the number of career professionals with substantial interagency experience could establish the human foundation for greater jointness at the interagency level, and could also appreciably reduce the current burden on the U.S. military by providing the leadership element of the civilian capacity needed for complex operations in the field.

Conclusion

Since the September 11 attacks, there has been much emphasis on the need for the federal government to "connect the dots." Even in the best of circumstances – when multiple agencies are focused on the same threats, when efforts to address critical problems are well-resourced, when technology enables a wealth of information to be integrated and accessible to multiple actors – connecting the dots in today's security environment is extremely challenging. And unfortunately, ideal circumstances are not the norm. The United States needs a new national security architecture, one that will make integration, shared focus, consistency of approach and unity of effort the defining characteristics of U.S. national security policy.

Process and organizational structures are not substitutes for good policy, but they can enable its formulation and execution. The United States needs a national security process built on interagency strategic planning, programming, and budgeting. A more integrated national security approach will not guarantee all the dots are connected every time, but it will greatly increase the chance that many of the dots are connected more often, and in so doing help us see and respond to the whole picture more quickly and clearly.

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